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Summary
Background Although pricing policies for alcohol are known to be eﬀ ective, little is known about how speciﬁ c 
interventions aﬀ ect health-care costs and health-related quality-of-life outcomes for diﬀ erent types of drinkers. We 
assessed eﬀ ects of alcohol pricing and promotion policy options in various population subgroups.
Methods We built an epidemiological mathematical model to appraise 18 pricing policies, with English data from the 
Expenditure and Food Survey and the General Household Survey for average and peak alcohol consumption. We used 
results from econometric analyses (256 own-price and cross-price elasticity estimates) to estimate eﬀ ects of policies 
on alcohol consumption. We applied risk functions from systemic reviews and meta-analyses, or derived from 
attributable fractions, to model the eﬀ ect of consumption changes on mortality and disease prevalence for 
47 illnesses. 
Findings General price increases were eﬀ ective for reduction of consumption, health-care costs, and health-related 
quality of life losses in all population subgroups. Minimum pricing policies can maintain this level of eﬀ ectiveness 
for harmful drinkers while reducing eﬀ ects on consumer spending for moderate drinkers. Total bans of supermarket 
and oﬀ -license discounting are eﬀ ective but banning only large discounts has little eﬀ ect. Young adult drinkers aged 
18–24 years are especially aﬀ ected by policies that raise prices in pubs and bars.
Interpretation Minimum pricing policies and discounting restrictions might warrant further consideration because 
both strategies are estimated to reduce alcohol consumption, and related health harms and costs, with drinker 
spending increases targeting those who incur most harm.
Funding Policy Research Programme, UK Department of Health.
Introduction
In many countries, rising public concern about the 
harmful eﬀ ects of alcohol use on society has led to an 
increased focus on the potential of public health 
interventions.1–3 Long-term alcohol use is the cause of 
several diseases such as alcoholic liver disease, and 
increases the risk of many partially attributable chronic 
disorders (eg, oesophageal cancers), with acute 
intoxication being associated with acute adverse events 
such as road traﬃ  c accidents, falls, and assault.1 The 
resulting burden aﬀ ects quality of life for drinkers and 
their families, and health-care resources. In England, 
there were an estimated 800 000 alcohol-attributable 
hospital admissions in the 2006/07 ﬁ nancial year,4 with 
the total yearly cost of alcohol-related harm to the National 
Health Service (NHS) of £2·7 billion ($US4·2 billion)11 in 
2006/07 prices.5
Policies that increase retail prices are regarded 
internationally as among the most eﬀ ective options from 
the various available interventions.2 The active component 
for such policies is the price elasticity of demand—an 
econometric measure of the average consumer response 
to a change in retail price. Results of two recent meta-
analyses are similar, one with a median elasticity of 
–0·497 (with 1172 separate international estimates of 
elasticity)6 and the other with a mean elasticity of –0·51, 7 
implying that a 10% rise in price might be expected to 
reduce overall demand for alcohol by about 5%. UK 
researchers8 provide own-price and cross-price elasticities 
for diﬀ erent types of alcohol by retail sector and price 
point. In systematic reviews,9 researchers also identiﬁ ed 
a large number of studies that consistently reported 
evidence for a direct association between increases in 
taxation or pricing of alcohol and reductions in acute and 
chronic ill health, accidents, crime, and violent 
incidents.
As part of the 2007 update of the national alcohol 
strategy, the UK Government announced that it would 
commission an “independent national review of evidence 
on the relationship between alcohol price, promotion 
and harm”.10 The list of candidate policies to be appraised 
was drawn up in consultation with government and 
informed by systematic reviews that were undertaken as 
part of the project. We modelled the eﬀ ects of the 
following alcohol pricing and promotion policy options 
for England: across-the-board price increases, policies 
setting a minimum price per unit (eg, a unit of alcohol, 
10 mL ethanol, cannot be sold for less than £0·40), and 
policies restricting price-based promotions in the oﬀ -
trade sector (eg, banning buy-one-get-one-free oﬀ ers). 
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We aimed to diﬀ erentiate eﬀ ects on population subgroups 
of special interest to government:10 hazardous drinkers 
aged 18–24 years, harmful drinkers, and moderate 
drinkers (underage drinkers were assessed in the model 
but excluded from this report).
Method
Study population
We developed a model to estimate how price changes 
aﬀ ect alcohol consumption and health outcomes. We 
deﬁ ned 54 population subgroups as moderate, hazardous, 
and harmful drinkers (before policy implementation), 
split by sex and nine age bands. In accordance with UK 
Government recommendations for the maximum 
drinking levels, we deﬁ ned moderate drinkers as men 
averaging 21 or fewer units of alcohol per week or women 
14 or fewer per week, hazardous drinkers as men 
averaging between 21 and 50 units per week or women 
between 14 and 35 per week, and harmful drinkers as 
men averaging more than 50 units per week or women 
more than 35 per week. Comprehensive details of the 
method are provided elsewhere.8 
Moderate* Hazardous† Harmful‡ 18–24 year old 
hazardous
England§
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Total
Population
England¶ (millions) 10·9
(25%)
11·9
(27%)
4·6
(10%)
3·7
(8%)
1·7
(4%)
1·2
(3%)
0·5
(1%)
0·4
(<1%)
21·5
(49%)
22·4
(51%)
43·9
Self-reported alcohol expenditure|| and consumption**
Mean spend per year
Total (£) 370 160 1230 690 2780 1510 1560 1060 820 370 590
On-trade 288
(78%)
95
(59%)
849
(69%)
294
(43%)
1785
(64%)
433
(29%)
1390
(89%)
859
(81%)
579
(71%)
170
(46%)
370
(63%)
Oﬀ -trade 82
(22%)
65
(41%)
381
(31%)
396
(57%)
995
(36%)
1077
(71%)
170
(11%)
201
(19%)
291
(29%)
200
(54%)
220
(37%)
Mean consumption per week
Total units†† 7·8 3·9 31·8 21·2 80·9 55·1 31·8 21·7 20·8 11·1 15·8
Beer 4·4
(56%)
0·7
(17%)
17·6
(55%)
3·4
(16%)
51·5
(64%)
10·5
(19%)
21·5
(68%)
4·6
(21%)
12·2
(59%)
1·9
(17%)
6·9
(44%)
Wine 2·3
(30%)
2·2
(57%)
10·4
(33%)
13·4
(63%)
19·4
(24%)
32·9
(60%)
2·5
(8%)
6·6
(30%)
6·0
(29%)
6·7
(60%)
6·3
(40%)
Spirit 1·0
(12%)
0·7
(19%)
3·3
(10%)
3·3
(15%)
8·3
(10%)
7·4
(13%)
5·4
(17%)
6·1
(28%)
2·2
(11%)
1·8
(16%)
2·0
(13%)
Ready-to-drink 0·1
(1%)
0·3
(7%)
0·5
(2%)
1·1
(5%)
1·7
(2%)
4·3
(8%)
2·4
(8%)
4·4
(20%)
0·4
(2%)
0·7
(7%)
0·6
(4%)
Peak daily consumption‡‡ (units) 3·8 2·3 9·4 6·2 14·4 10·6 12·3 7·3 6·2 3·7 4·9
Proportion who binge§§ 11% 8% 40% 34% 69% 65% 63% 53% 24% 18% 21%
Modelled alcohol-attributable health harm¶¶
Illnesses per year (000s)
Chronic 36·6 29·2 73·9 57·9 98·3 34·7 1·1 1·1 209·2 122·3 331·5
Acute 29·1 16·3 44·0 19·0 28·7 12·6 5·6 2·4 103·6 49·1 152·7
Deaths per year||||
Chronic –3930 –1260 –2030 –1670 6770 2530 10 10 4870 2930 7800
Acute 600 200 880 220 590 150 110 10 2100 590 2690
Hospital admissions per year (000s) 97·5 70·7 189·3 128·3 233·7 83·2 8·9 4·8 523·6 284·5 808·1
Health-care costs (£million 
per year)
431 295 731 482 719 270 41 21 1895 1057 2952
QALY loss per year (000s) 18·7 13·5 40·8 24·8 48·9 19·8 2·9 1·5 109·3 58·8 168·1
QALY=quality-adjusted life years. *Adult drinkers with a mean consumption per week ≤21 units for men and ≤14 for women. Excludes abstainers and underage drinkers. 
†All drinkers with a mean consumption per week of >21 to <50 for men and >14 to <35 for women. ‡All drinkers with a mean consumption per week of >50 units for men 
and >35 units for women. §Excludes children under 11 years of age. ¶Source: ONS Mid-2006 Population Estimates for England (ages 11 to 89 inclusive), combined with 
proportions from General Household Survey 2006.14 ||Source: Expenditure and Food Survey 01/02 to 05/06, inﬂ ated to 2007 prices with oﬀ -trade interpolated over 
AC Nielsen price distribution.13 **Source: General Household Survey 2006 for persons aged 16 and over; Smoking Drinking and Drug Use Survey 2006 for persons aged 
under 16.14 ††1 unit=10 mL by volume ethanol. ‡‡Deﬁ ned as the maximum daily amount drunk in the week before interview; ﬁ gure shown is subpopulation mean. 
§§Maximum daily consumption >8 units for men and >6 units for women. ¶¶Attribution estimates based on full eﬀ ect results of Sheﬃ  eld Alcohol Policy Model v1.18 with 
alcohol consumption set to zero. ||||Attribution of deaths to alcohol is estimated to be negative overall for moderate drinkers, because of protective eﬀ ects of low levels of 
alcohol.consumption in disorders, such as ischaemic heart disease.
Table 1: Baseline alcohol consumption, purchasing, and modelled alcohol-attributable health harms in England
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Price-to-consumption model
We estimated the eﬀ ect of a policy by ﬁ rst examining a 
cohort of drinkers’ baseline purchasing and consumption 
of alcohol, and then simulating a new mean per week 
and maximum daily alcohol consumption for every 
individual after policy implementation. This model 
needed syntheses of several data sources. We used the 
Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS), providing 
individual-level purchasing transaction data for about 
5500 households in England per year—65 952 individuals 
in total during the 5 years from April 1, 2001, to March 31, 
2006 (webappendix p 1). Data for demographics, quantity 
of alcohol purchased, and prices paid (deﬂ ated to 2007 
rates) were available, but mean per week and maximum 
daily alcohol consumption were not surveyed.12 We 
applied weights provided by the data depositors to correct 
for sampling bias. The Nielsen Company provided two 
useful datasets for July 12, 2007–08, on alcohol sales: a 
gold standard distribution of oﬀ -trade prices for ten price 
ranges, enabling calibration of the detailed EFS-based 
price distribution via linear interpolation; and the 
distribution of oﬀ -trade price-based promotions, allowing 
modelling of discount restrictions (unpublished data).13
Consumption data (units per week and maximum daily 
intake) were available (by beer, wine, spirit, and ready-to-
drink [ie, alcopops or premixed drinks]) and were extracted, 
at individual respondent level, from the yearly General 
Household Survey (GHS) for 2006.14 We used sampling 
weights to correct for bias. Data for prices paid, and on-
trade and oﬀ -trade split were not available. Comparison of 
the GHS with HM Customs and Excise clearance data 
suggested that the GHS underestimated alcohol 
consumption by 21% in 2006,8 although no robust evidence 
was available to establish whether under-estimation was 
consistent across population subgroups. We decided not to 
inﬂ ate ﬁ gures to account for underestimation, because 
risk functions used in the model were also based on self-
reported consumption rather than true underlying 
consumption, and harm estimates were scaled to match 
routine available data for total population-level observed 
harm—eg, number of crimes or hospital admissions. 
To generate a connected analysis of prices paid and 
levels of consumption, we linked GHS and EFS data for 
each of the 54 subgroups. We used data about the 
preferences for oﬀ -trade versus on-trade purchasing and 
price distributions from the EFS to apportion GHS 
consumption data into 16 product categories: beer, wine, 
spirit, ready-to-drink, split by on-trade or oﬀ -trade, and 
split by low or high price with cut-oﬀ s of less than 
£0·30 per unit oﬀ -trade and less than £0·80 per unit on-
trade. We tested the assumption that EFS proportions of 
on-trade or oﬀ -trade and low or high price for each 
subgroup could be applied to share out GHS consumption 
in sensitivity analysis. Result of the linkage was a 
distribution of price paid for each of the 16 alcohol 
categories by each of the 54 population subgroups 
(864 price distributions). We then used the combined 
data both as the baseline pattern of consumption and 
prices paid for every subgroup modelled.
We used price elasticities derived from econometric 
modelling, providing estimated changes in mean 
consumption after a change in price.8 Details of the 
econometric model (webappendix pp 2–7) and resulting 
elasticity estimates are provided (webappendix pp 8–10). 
The price-to-consumption model input consisted of 16 by 
16 matrices containing both own-price elasticities (eg, a 
10% price rise in oﬀ -trade lower-priced beer would reduce 
consumption of this type of beer by 4·217%; an elasticity 
of –0·4217), and cross-price elasticities (eg, a 10% price 
rise in oﬀ -trade lower-priced beer would increase 
consumption of on-trade higher-priced wine by 0·02%; 
an elasticity of 0·0020), webappendix pp 9–10. 
We derived two separate matrices—one for moderate 
drinkers and one for an aggregation of hazardous and 
harmful drinkers. Although we undertook covariate 
adjustment for age, sex, and income among other 
variables, we could not calculate separate elasticities for 
age or sex subgroups because of our restricted sample 
size. Our matrix approach enabled analysis of important 
heterogeneity and complexity in consumer response to 
price changes—eg, trading down to cheap products, 
See Online for webappendix
% reduction 
in mean 
consumption
Health outcomes at full eﬀ ect*
Reduction in 
deaths (per year)
Reduction in 
illness per year 
(1000s)
Gain in QALYs 
per year 
(1000s)
Chronic Acute
£0·70 minimum price 18·6% 7150 100·2 23·3 52·1
£0·50 minimum price 6·9% 2930 40·9 8·1 20·7
£0·40 oﬀ -trade and £1·00 
on-trade minimum price
5·4% 1910 28·6 7·0 14·7
£0·45 minimum price 4·5% 1970 27·7 5·1 13·8
10% general price increase 4·4% 1460 20·5 5·8 11·2
Ban all oﬀ -trade discounts 2·8% 1140 15·4 3·6 8·2
£0·40 minimum price 2·6% 1180 16·9 2·9 8·2
£0·30 oﬀ -trade and £0·80p 
on-trade minimum price
2·1% 570 9·5 2·4 4·8
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >10% 1·6% 660 8·8 2·1 4·7
£0·35 minimum price 1·4% 600 9·0 1·3 4·2
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >20% 0·8% 330 4·4 1·1 2·4
£0·30 minimum price 0·6% 250 4·1 0·4 1·7
10% low-price on-trade increase 0·5% 120 2·1 0·6 1·1
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >30% 0·3% 140 1·8 0·5 1·0
10% low-price oﬀ -trade increase 0·2% 110 1·6 0·0 0·7
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >40% 0·1% 50 0·7 0·2 0·4
£0·20 minimum price 0·1% 30 0·6 –0·3 0·1
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >50% 0·0% 0 0·0 0·0 0·0
QALYs=quality-adjusted life years. *Full eﬀ ect reached 10 years post implementation. †Cumulative net saving (£million, 
including QALYs valuation).
Table 2: Estimated population-level eﬀ ect of pricing policies on alcohol consumption and health outcomes
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switching between diﬀ erent beverage types, and switching 
of purchasing between supermarkets and bars. 
To model the eﬀ ect of a policy, we assumed that retailers 
would increase prices for beverages aﬀ ected to make 
them just compliant and that other products would be 
unaﬀ ected, eg, for a £0·50 minimum price policy, a nine-
unit bottle of wine priced at £3·99 would increase to 
£4·50, whereas products costing more than £0·50 per 
unit would maintain their baseline price. We then 
estimated eﬀ ects on mean per week alcohol consumption 
in every subgroup by combining the implied changes to 
the price distributions for the products with the elasticity 
matrices. We then indirectly modelled eﬀ ects on 
maximum daily consumption by relating change in 
maximum daily consumption to change in mean 
consumption. We did this modelling with a least-squares 
linear regression model for each of the three consumption 
groups, derived from the GHS individual level data with 
peak daily consumption as a function of mean 
consumption, with covariates for age and sex. 
Consumption-to-harm model
We estimated the eﬀ ect of consumption changes on 
disease prevalence of 47 chronic and acute conditions.4 
Mortality rates were taken from Oﬃ  ce for National 
Statistics 2006 ﬁ gures for England and Wales.15 We 
estimated morbidity rates with published person-speciﬁ c 
hospital admissions for England in 2006.4 For chronic 
illnesses partially attributable to alcohol, we took risk 
functions relating mean alcohol consumption to relative 
risk (RR) of admission and mortality directly from a 
range of international evidence sources,16–20 diﬀ erentiating 
data by sex when available. For acute illnesses that are 
partially attributable to alcohol, evidence17,21,22 exists for 
observed alcohol-attributable fractions—eg, the estimated 
alcohol-attributable fraction for mortality resulting from 
road traﬃ  c accidents for men aged 25–34 years is 37%. 
We assumed that the RR of incurring such an illness is a 
function of maximum daily consumption (from the 
GHS), with RR equal to one below a speciﬁ ed threshold 
of consumption (3 units for women and 4 for men) and 
risk rising linearly thereafter.
   To estimate the slope of the RR function for every age 
and sex group we used ordinary least-squares regression 
to keep the diﬀ erence between predicted and observed 
alcohol-attributable fractions to a minimum. For acute 
illnesses that were wholly attributable to alcohol, we 
used the same approach apart from use of the observed 
total volume of events as the metric to ﬁ t absolute risk 
functions. For chronic diseases wholly attributable to 
alcohol, we assumed a threshold for risk of 2 units per 
day for women and 3 for men. We then used change in 
consumption and, hence, in risk over time to adjust 
observed mortality and morbidity rates with a 
generalisation of the attributable fraction, known as the 
potential impact fraction.23 For chronic illnesses, debate 
exists about the time lag between change in exposure 
and change in outcome.24 We chose a linear lag function 
of 10 years to realisation of full eﬀ ect (ie, reduction in 
risk), which is consistent with average estimates. 
For health economic outcomes, the average health-care 
care cost of each illness was derived from illness-speciﬁ c 
hospital inpatient estimates and aggregate level hospital 
outpatient, accident and emergency, ambulance services, 
general practitioner consultation, practice nurse 
consultation, dependency-prescribed drugs, and specialist 
treatment services estimates from UK Department of 
Health in 2006/07 prices.5 We did not quantify policy and 
administration costs for pricing regulations, assuming 
them to be negligible. We extracted mean health-related 
quality of life valuations for each disease from the Health 
Outcomes Data Repository database of utilities measured 
by the EQ-5D method25 and age-adjusted these valuations 
with population utility estimates26 to estimate quality-
adjusted life years. We applied the resulting adjusted 
mortality and morbidity rates to life tables of the English 
population for men and women, enabling estimation of 
changes in deaths, illnesses, admissions, health-care costs, 
and drinker quality-adjusted life years. The total valuation 
of each policy was calculated as the cumulative net saving 
during the 10 years to full eﬀ ectiveness, with costs 
Increase in 
spending (£ per 
drinker per year)
Health economic outcomes at full eﬀ ect*
Reduction in 
admissions per 
year (000s)
Health-care cost 
saving per year 
(£million)
Cumulative 
net saving 
(£millions)†
 Chronic 
disorders
Acute 
disorders
£0·70 minimum price 54·30 226·4 571 132 16 000
£0·50 minimum price 36·80 92·2 228 46 6200
£0·40 oﬀ -trade and £1·00 
on-trade minimum price
37·10 66·3 160 40 4600
£0·45 minimum price 29·30 62·2 153 29 4100
10% general price increase 32·90 48·0 115 33 3500
Ban all oﬀ -trade discounts 11·20 35·2 86 21 2500
£0·40 minimum price 21·50 37·8 93 16 2400
£0·30 oﬀ -trade and £0·80 
on-trade minimum price
13·80 22·3 53 14 1600
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >10% 6·40 20·2 49 12 1400
£0·35 minimum price 14·30 20·1 49 7 1200
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >20% 3·20 10·1 24 6 700
£0·30 minimum price 7·90 8·9 22 2 500
10% low-price on-trade increase 2·70 5·0 12 3 400
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >30% 1·40 4·2 10 3 300
10% low-price oﬀ -trade increase 3·30 3·4 9 0 200
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >40% 0·50 1·6 4 1 100
£0·20 minimum price 1·60 0·9 3 –2 0
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >50% 0·0 0·0 0 0 0
QALYs=quality-adjusted life years. *Full eﬀ ect reached 10 years post implementation. †Cumulative net saving 
(£ million, including QALYs valuation).
Table 3: Estimated population-level eﬀ ect of pricing policies on alcohol consumption and health 
economic outcomes
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discounted at 3·5% and quality-adjusted life years valued 
at £50 000 per quality-adjusted life year and discounted at 
1·5%.27 To assist policymakers in making judgments of 
proportionality, we also estimated for each policy the mean 
eﬀ ect on consumer spending, revenue to oﬀ -trade and on-
trade retail sectors, and tax receipts to the UK Treasury.
Role of the funding source
The funder deﬁ ned population subgroups of interest 
before analysis and provided a long list of policy options. 
Final decisions on the scope, methods of analysis, 
reporting, and the decision to submit for publication 
were made by the research team. The UK Department of 
Health encourages publication of scientiﬁ cally robust 
research results; however, the Department has a time 
limited period within which to comment before any 
ﬁ ndings deriving from the research are submitted for 
publication. The corresponding author had full access to 
all the data in the study and had ﬁ nal responsibility for 
the decision to submit for publication.
Results
Table 1 shows the baseline estimates for alcohol 
purchasing, consumption, and health harms. Purchasing 
preferences vary across the 54 subgroups modelled: 
women purchase a higher proportion (54%) of their 
alcohol from oﬀ -trade outlets (supermarkets and oﬀ -
licenses) than do men (29%), and people aged 18–24 years 
purchase alcohol mainly in the on-trade sector (pubs, 
bars, and clubs). Beverage preferences vary, with 59% of 
men’s alcohol consumption as beer, wine as 60% of 
women’s, and ready-to-drink beverages as 20% of 
consumption for women aged 18–24 years. Consumption 
patterns also vary. Moderate male drinkers (excluding 
those abstaining at the time of survey) consume on 
average about 8 units per week and only a small 
proportion engage in heavy episodic drinking, whereas 
harmful male drinkers consume a mean 80 units and 
69% are heavy episodic drinkers. Health harms also vary, 
with male harmful drinkers incurring the largest 
proportion of alcohol-attributable mortality, ill health, 
alcohol-attributable admissions, and health-care costs. 
Tables 2 and 3 and ﬁ gure 1 show 18 diﬀ erent policies 
ranked by change in population-level consumption. 
Results diﬀ er slightly from the original report8 because 
the life table structure was revised in the latest version 
(version 1.1) of the model. Acute outcomes are fully 
realised 1 year after policy implementation, whereas 
chronic health outcomes, such as yearly reduction in 
chronic illnesses, are presented for year 10 after policy 
implementation to show the full eﬀ ect. 
The eﬀ ects of a minimum price policy vary greatly with 
the chosen threshold. Eﬀ ectiveness increases very rapidly 
in the range from £0·40 to £0·70. Setting a diﬀ erential 
minimum price in the oﬀ -trade and on-trade would 
substantially boost eﬀ ectiveness. Restrictions to oﬀ -trade 
discounting tend to be one of the least eﬀ ective policies. 
Beneﬁ ts in terms of reduced deaths and illnesses and 
subsequent gains in quality-adjusted life years are 
roughly proportional to the magnitude of consumption 
reduction, with some variation arising because of 
diﬀ erential population subgroup eﬀ ects. A 10% general 
price increase would reduce consumption by 4·4% and 
deaths by 1460 per year at 10 years after policy 
implementation. By contrast, a £0·45 minimum price 
would lead to a similar consumption reduction of 4·5% 
but with 1970 deaths avoided. A £0·40 oﬀ -trade price 
combined with a £1·00 on-trade price leads to a greater 
reduction in consumption (5·4%), but slightly fewer 
deaths are avoided because this policy would aﬀ ect young 
people drinking in the on-trade who have a low overall 
mortality risk. 
For example, table 4 shows the eﬀ ect of a £0·50 
minimum price on the yearly prevalence of illness 10 years 
after policy implementation. Of 49 000 cases of illness 
prevented by the intervention, about 30 000 are in men. 
Most of the harm reductions arise in chronic disorders in 
people aged 45 years and older, especially in diseases of the 
circulatory system (net of any increased cases of ischaemic 
heart disease). However, reductions in illness are also 
Figure 1: Estimated eﬀ ects of policies on reduction in consumption, health-care cost savings, and quality 
adjusted life-year (QALY) gains to drinkers
*Uses UK Department of Health QALYs’ valuation of £50 000.
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achieved in disorders wholly attributable to alcohol and in 
acute partially attributable to alcohol, including road traﬃ  c 
accidents and falls. A slight increase in cases of 
type 2 diabetes is predicted in women younger than age 
45 years because of lost protective beneﬁ ts of moderate 
alcohol consumption.
For health economic outcomes, both reduced admissions 
and health-care savings are strongly related to the extent of 
consumption reduction that would be achieved by a policy 
(table 2). The relation between clinical eﬀ ectiveness and 
change in consumer spending on alcohol is less clearly 
deﬁ ned. For example, a £0·40 minimum price and a total 
ban on oﬀ -trade discounting are similarly eﬀ ective in 
reduction of consumption and health harms, but they have 
diﬀ erent consumer spending implications. Total health-
related beneﬁ ts (from a health-related quality of life and 
healch-care perspective only) could be large, with a 
£0·50 minimum price estimated to deliver £6·2 billion in 
net present beneﬁ t accumulated 10 years after policy 
implementation. Figure 1 shows that most of this beneﬁ t 
would arise from the ﬁ nancial valuation of the quality-
adjusted life years gain to drinkers. For the HM Treasury, 
policies would be mostly revenue neutral because decreases 
in duty receipts (related to decreased volume of 
consumption) would be oﬀ set by increases in sales tax 
receipts (related to increases in overall expenditure). 
Overall, alcohol retailers in both the oﬀ -trade and on-trade 
would probably have increased revenues from the policies. 
The estimated eﬀ ect on moderate, hazardous, harmful, 
and 18–24 year hazardous drinkers (table 5) shows 
substantial subgroup variations in consumption 
reductions, changes in spending, and gain in 
quality-adjusted life years. Figure 2 shows that, generally, 
the largest health gains arise in harmful drinkers 
(alongside their increased spending burden), whereas 
moderate drinkers have the smallest health improvements 
per person. However, notable between-policy diﬀ erences 
exist. For example, a £0·45 minimum price would be 
more eﬀ ective overall than a 10% general price increase, 
 Moderate* Hazardous† Harmful‡ 18–24 years 
hazardous
England 
total
Percentage reduction in mean consumption per week (units)
£0·70 minimum price 11·3% 18·5% 24·1% 10·5% 18·6%
£0·50 minimum price 3·5% 5·9% 10·3% 3·0% 6·9%
£0·40 oﬀ -trade or £1·00 on-trade 
minimum price
3·9% 4·5% 6·9% 9·8% 5·4%
£0·45 minimum price 2·2% 3·5% 7·1% 1·6% 4·5%
10% general price increase 3·5% 4·7% 4·5% 6·0% 4·4%
Ban all oﬀ -trade discounts 1·8% 3·1% 3·2% 0·9% 2·8%
£0·40 minimum price 1·2% 1·8% 4·5% 0·7% 2·6%
£0·30 oﬀ -trade or £0·80 on-trade 
minimum price
1·3% 1·9% 2·5% 7·2% 2·1%
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >10% 1·0% 1·8% 1·8% 0·5% 1·6%
£0·35 minimum price 0·6% 0·7% 2·6% 0·2% 1·4%
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >20% 0·5% 0·9% 0·9% 0·2% 0·8%
£0·30 minimum price 0·2% 0·3% 1·3% 0·0% 0·6%
10% low-price on-trade increase 0·4% 0·6% 0·4% 2·4% 0·5%
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >30% 0·2% 0·4% 0·4% 0·1% 0·3%
10% low-price oﬀ -trade increase 0·1% 0·1% 0·4% 0·0% 0·2%
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >40% 0·1% 0·1% 0·1% 0·0% 0·1%
£0·20 minimum price 0·0% 0·0% 0·2% 0·0% 0·1%
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >50% 0·0% 0·0% 0·0% 0·0% 0·0%
(Continues on next page)
11–24 years 25–44 years 45–64 years 65 years or older Total All
M F M F M F M F M F
Alcoholic disorders* –140 –130 –860 –660 –1980 –1590 –1340 –1450 –4320 –3830 –8150
Alcohol poisoning† –40 –110 –90 –230 –60 –180 –30 –50 –220 –570 –790
Neoplasms‡ 0 0 –10 –30 –290 –170 –390 –160 –690 –360 –1050
Diabetes mellitus§ 0 10 –40 50 –760 –160 –260 –140 –1060 –240 –1300
Epilepsy and status epilepticus¶ –90 –60 –120 –270 –210 –460 –680 –1050 –1100 –1840 –2940
Hypertensive diseases|| –20 –20 –600 –350 –7940 –2890 –9910 –4580 –18 470 –7840 –26 310
Other diseases of the circulatory** system –10 –10 –70 –60 –470 –340 –2080 –2210 –2630 –2620 –5250
Diseases of the digestive system†† –20 –20 –120 –80 –360 –270 –340 –280 –840 –650 –1490
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous 
tissue‡‡
0 0 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –30 –30 –60
Road traﬃ  c accidents§§ –20 –10 –30 –10 –10 –10 0 0 –60 –30 –90
Other accidents¶¶ –40 –20 –90 –70 –100 –140 –260 –310 –490 –540 –1030
Intentional self harm|||| –20 –70 –60 –140 –40 –110 –20 –40 –140 –360 –500
Assault*** –40 –10 –70 –30 –20 –10 0 0 –130 –50 –180
Total –440 –450 –2170 –1890 –12 250 –6340 –15 320 –10 280 –30 180 –18 960 –49 140
M=male. F=female. Includes ICD-10 codes:  *E24.4, F10, G31.2, G62.1, G72.1, I426, K29.2, K70, and K86.0; †T51.0, T51.1, T519, and X45; ‡C00–C15, C18, C20, C22, C32, and 
C50; §E11; ¶ G40–41; ||I10–I15; **I20–I25, I47, I48, I50, I51, I60–I62, I63–I66, I69.0–I69.4, and I85; †† K22.6, K73, K74, K80, K85, and K86.1; ‡‡L40 and L40.5; §§V02.3–V89.9 
(some intermediate codes excluded); ¶¶V90–V97, W00–W19, W24–W34, W65–W74, W78–W79, X00–X09, and X31; ||||X60–X84 and Y10–Y33; and ***X85–Y09.
Table 4: Estimated eﬀ ect on alcohol-related disorders of a £0·50 minimum-price policy on disease prevalence by age (10 years after implementation)
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but is achieved with a much lessened eﬀ ect on moderate 
drinkers’ spend and larger increases in spend for harmful 
drinkers. This diﬀ erential eﬀ ect arose because minimum 
price policies target cheap alcohol products, which make 
up a higher proportion of the average selection of alcohol 
purchases for heavier drinkers than for moderate 
drinkers.
Analysis of eﬀ ects on people aged 18–24 years who are 
hazardous drinkers shows that policies aﬀ ecting cheap 
products in the on-trade (eg, a 10% increase in low-price 
on-trade alcohol and the diﬀ erential minimum-price 
policies) would have greater eﬀ ectiveness for this 
subgroup than for the population average. Policies 
targeting the cheapest oﬀ -trade alcohol (for example, a 
£0·30 minimum price) are less eﬀ ective than average for 
those aged 18–24 years, who consume most of their 
alcohol in the on-trade.
As a form of model validation, we examined model 
outputs if population alcohol consumption was reduced 
to zero. We estimated the overall cost of alcohol-attributable 
illness at £3·0 billion per year, similar to the £2·7 billion 
calculated by the Department of Health.5 Furthermore, 
the model estimated that a 10% general price rise would 
reduce overall consumption by 4·4%, an implied overall 
price elasticity of –0·44, which was very similar to the 
Gallet6 meta-analysis median of –0·47. 
Sensitivity analyses for key model parameters provide an 
indication of the robustness of results. For a 
£0·40 minimum-price policy, we report the eﬀ ects of 
parameter changes on the net present beneﬁ t 10 years after 
implementation (baseline estimate £2·4 billion to the 
nearest £100 million). Variation of the time needed to 
achieve full eﬀ ects on chronic health harms shows that a 
5-year lag would lead to £3·4 billion (+42%) compared with 
£1·8 billion (–25%) for a 15-year lag. Testing an alternative 
assumption that there are no protective health eﬀ ects of 
moderate alcohol consumption in cardiovascular disease, 
type 2 diabetes, and cholelithiasis led to £2·4 billion 
(–2%)—the diﬀ erence was quite small because the original 
cardiovascular RR functions were J shaped, whereby 
marginal reductions in consumption might lead to more 
or less risk, dependent on baseline consumption. Changing 
the gradient of the mean-to-peak consumption relation 
with the lower 95% CI led to £2·2 billion (–8%), whereas 
the upper interval led to £2·9 billion (+21%). 
Because we used EFS proportions of on-trade or oﬀ -trade 
and low-price or high-price purchasing for a subgroup to 
apportion GHS consumption, we tested whether beverage 
preferences in GHS and EFS were similar. We identiﬁ ed a 
good match overall, but with women older than 25 years 
purchasing more beer and spirits in the EFS than they 
consumed in the GHS, and so ran a sensitivity analysis in 
which a proportion of oﬀ -trade purchases by this group 
were reallocated to other subgroups. This analysis in 
which some oﬀ -trade purchasing by women older than 25 
years was reallocated to other subgroups shows slightly 
increased eﬀ ectiveness for the £0·40 minimum price 
(consumption changes for drinkers classiﬁ ed as moderate 
was –1·5%, for hazardous –2·4%, and for harmful 
drinkers –6·3%, instead of –1·2%, –1·8%, and –4·5%, 
respectively) because more of the oﬀ -trade consumption 
 Moderate* Hazardous† Harmful‡ 18–24 years 
hazardous
England 
total
(Continued from previous page)
Increase in spending (£ per person per year)
£0·70 minimum price 22·92 97·50 203·10 96·40 54·30
£0·50 minimum price 11·80 68·20 163·40 66·60 36·80
£0·40 oﬀ -trade and 100p on-trade 
minimum price
13·60 62·40 169·60 38·30 37·10
£0·45 minimum price 8·70 53·90 137·40 53·50 29·30
10% general price increase 17·10 50·20 115·90 57·90 32·90
Ban all oﬀ -trade discounts 4·20 19·50 49·10 13·60 11·20
£0·40 minimum price 5·90 39·10 105·50 39·70 21·50
£0·30 oﬀ -trade and £0·80 on-trade 
minimum price
4·90 20·80 70·40 -7·50 13·80
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >10% 2·30 11·30 27·80 7·30 6·40
£0·35 minimum price 3·70 25·50 72·90 26·00 14·30
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >20% 1·20 5·70 14·10 3·60 3·20
£0·30 minimum price 1·90 13·70 43·00 13·80 7·90
10% low-price on-trade increase 1·40 3·40 12·30 -6·20 2·70
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >30% 0·50 2·50 6·00 1·50 1·40
10% low-price oﬀ -trade increase 0·90 5·90 16·30 5·90 3·30
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >40% 0·20 0·90 2·30 0·60 0·50
£0·20 minimum price 0·30 2·50 10·00 3·20 1·60
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >50% 0·00 0·00 0·20 0·00 0·00
Cumulative gain in QALYs after 10 years (discounted, 000s)
£0·70 minimum price 45·3 98·9 103·1 2·6 248·4
£0·50 minimum price 15·4 33·7 47·3 0·8 96·7
£0·40 oﬀ -trade and £1·00 on-trade 
minimum price
14·5 22·0 33·7 2·6 72·0
£0·45 minimum price 9·9 20·5 33·3 0·4 63·9
10% general price increase 12·1 21·8 21·0 1·5 55·5
Ban all oﬀ -trade discounts 7·2 16·5 15·4 0·2 39·1
£0·40 minimum price 5·5 10·7 21·5 0·2 37·7
£0·30 oﬀ -trade and £0·80 on-trade 
minimum price
4·8 7·2 11·2 1·8 24·2
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >10% 4·1 9·7 8·8 0·1 22·6
£0·35 minimum price 2·3 4·5 12·3 0·1 19·1
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >20% 2·0 4·9 4·4 0·1 11·3
£0·30 minimum price 0·5 1·3 5·9 0·0 7·6
10% low-price on-trade increase 1·4 2·0 2·1 0·6 5·6
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >30% 0·8 2·1 1·8 0·0 4·7
10% low-price oﬀ -trade increase 0·1 0·5 2·3 0·0 2·8
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >40% 0·3 0·8 0·7 0·0 1·8
£0·20 minimum price -0·2 -0·2 0·4 0·0 -0·1
Ban oﬀ -trade discounts >50% -0·1 0·0 0·0 0·0 -0·1
QALYs=quality-adjusted life years. *Adult drinkers with a mean consumption per week ≤21 units for men and ≤14 for 
women. Excludes abstainers and underage drinkers. †All drinkers with a mean consumption per week of >21 to <50 for 
men and >14 to <35 for women. ‡All drinkers with a mean consumption per week of >50 units for men and >35 units 
for women.
Table 5: Estimated population subgroup eﬀ ect of alcohol pricing policies
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targeted by the policy is allocated to male drinkers, for 
whom a consumption decrease equivalent to that of 
women in relative terms would produce a larger decrease 
in absolute terms because of higher baseline consumption 
levels for men than for women. The sensitivity analyses 
left the relative ranking and order of magnitude eﬀ ects of 
the policies broadly unchanged, although those which 
diﬀ erentially aﬀ ect subgroups could cause some policies 
aﬀ ecting on-trade and oﬀ -trade prices to switch rank.
Discussion
Our study estimated that policies that increase the price 
of alcohol would reduce consumption, leading to 
reductions in mortality, disease prevalence and 
admissions, and savings in health-care costs. We 
predicted that harmful drinker subgroups would have 
the largest health gains and spending burden from 
pricing policies. Minimum price policies especially target 
heavy drinkers in terms of harm reduction and consumer 
spending. Policies aﬀ ecting on-trade alcohol prices would 
be most eﬀ ective for hazardous drinkers aged 18–24 years. 
The analysis of scale of eﬀ ect and how economic 
outcomes, including consumer spending, are distributed 
between moderate, hazardous, and harmful drinker 
subgroups helps to identify those who are advantaged 
and disadvantaged by the diﬀ erent policy options.
For policy makers, a balance between reduction in 
health harms and increased consumer spending might 
be important for proportionality, and one implication of 
our study is that minimum pricing strategies might help 
achieve this balance. For example, a general 10% price 
rise is estimated to reduce consumption by 4·4% and 
alcohol-related harm by £3·5 billion over 10 years, but a 
minimum price of £0·45 could produce a similar overall 
consumption eﬀ ect, while achieving greater reductions 
in harm and a rebalancing of spending eﬀ ect away from 
moderate drinkers towards heavier drinkers. Very low 
minimum price thresholds would have little eﬀ ect, but 
eﬀ ectiveness accelerates rapidly between thresholds of 
£0·40 and £0·70. This acceleration is explained by two 
eﬀ ects relating to the estimated cumulative oﬀ -trade price 
distribution (ﬁ gure 3): an increased minimum price 
covers more of the market than do other policies and so 
more products are aﬀ ected (eg, 57% for £0·40 versus 70% 
for £0·45); and there is a larger mean price increase for 
the products aﬀ ected (34% for £0·40 versus 39% for 
£0·45). Both of these eﬀ ects together lead to acceleration 
of reduction in consumption and harms, with almost 
double the number of deaths prevented. Prohibition of 
large discounts (eg, buy-one-get-one-free oﬀ ers) alone has 
little eﬀ ect, but tight restrictions or total bans on oﬀ -trade 
discounting could have eﬀ ects similar in scale to minimum 
price thresholds of £0·30–0·40. For young adults, and 
especially for those aged 18–24 years who are hazardous 
drinkers, policies that raise the price of cheaper alcohol in 
the on-trade sector are most eﬀ ective for achievement of 
harm reductions.
Comparisons with international evidence on the health 
eﬀ ects of the pricing policies examined in our study are 
diﬃ  cult. No previous research exists that compares the 
full range of pricing policy options that we have examined. 
Data are available about broad tax and price eﬀ ects, a 
systematic review9 of which concludes that price change 
can be an eﬀ ective policy in harm reduction. Hollingworth 
and co-workers28 estimated that a 17% price rise could 
reduce premature deaths by 1490 during the lifetime of 
the existing 4 million people aged 20 years in the USA. 
Doran and colleagues29 estimated that equalisation of 
taxation rates per unit of alcohol in Australia would gain 
11 000 disability-adjusted life years during the lifetime of 
the present Australian population. Chisholm and 
co-workers30 estimated that 25% taxation would save 
1576 disability-adjusted life years per 1 million population 
per year for a region of countries including England. 
Figure 2: Comparison of policy eﬀ ects on health-related quality of life and spending for moderate, hazardous, 
and harmful drinkers
QALY=quality-adjusted life years.
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However, to compare results like these directly with 
ours—eg, a 10% general price increase would reduce 
deaths per year by 1460 after full eﬀ ectiveness, with 
11 200 yearly quality-adjusted life years gained and cost 
savings of £148 million, in a population of 44 million—is 
diﬃ  cult. Insuﬃ  cient information is available in the 
published studies to recalculate like for like comparison 
of policies (eg, mean price change) and outcomes 
achieved by them (eg, change in harms on a speciﬁ ed 
measure over a speciﬁ ed time frame), especially when 
adjusting for our deﬁ ned population groups.
Several issues not addressed by this study could be 
considered for future research. An analysis of the 
supply-side response to pricing policies should be 
undertaken, because it is plausible that policies that have 
a large eﬀ ect on beverage prices might lead to market 
restructuring, and supply-side responses are unlikely to 
be straightforward.31,32 Furthermore, an analysis could 
take a broad economic perspective, including in the model 
costs to the alcohol industry, beneﬁ ts of consumption33 
such as drinkers’ pleasure and social capital, and costs to 
third parties—eg, eﬀ ects on drinkers’ families.34 An 
important equity question that remains to be answered is 
what eﬀ ect do these policies have on people from 
low-income households? To gain further insight into the 
eﬀ ect of price changes on underage drinkers, broader 
alcohol availability needs to be considered, because young 
people obtain alcohol from relatives and friends in 
addition to purchasing it directly.35
The primary limitations of this study relate to data 
availability. Ideally, longitudinal data would be available 
to analyse price elasticities for alcohol (webappendix 
p 11). However, such data are unavailable and the use of 
existing data in a cross-sectional form is the only way 
forward for policy analysis. EFS data, which provides 
information on alcohol prices paid at an individual level, 
measures alcohol purchasing rather than consumption, 
thus detailed consumption patterns cannot be considered, 
and consumption may also be misallocated to the 
purchaser. General population surveys, including EFS 
and GHS, are also known to underestimate alcohol 
expenditure and consumption levels because of under-
reporting, and can under-represent population groups at 
risk of alcohol-related harm, such as the homeless.36 
Although the 17 equation system modelled in the 
econometric work shows some of the complexity of the 
problem, it remains a relatively simple approach—
especially with zero consumption observations not 
modelled separately from non-zero observations—and so 
further research developing and testing alternative 
econometrics methods and models is strongly 
recommended. We model discount bans purely in terms 
of the price increase needed for compliance. Any 
additional psychological eﬀ ects on purchasing, such as 
getting a bargain, could not be accounted for, and our 
model might thus be underestimating the eﬀ ects of 
discount restrictions. A new longitudinal survey obtaining 
price, consumer response to price-based promotions, 
and consumption data would be very valuable in such a 
context, and we would regard this research as a priority to 
enable long-term assessment of alcohol policies. 
Further analytical research would help reduce 
uncertainty about the time lag between consumption 
change and risk change for chronic illnesses, and also 
about alcohol as a risk factor for acute illnesses, where the 
relation between consumption change and risk change is 
less well established. Finally, we used 2006 data for alcohol 
consumption and purchasing as the baseline and did not 
formally analyse trends, implicitly assuming steady-state 
alcohol consumption unless alcohol prices change. This 
factor enabled analysis of policy eﬀ ect, assuming all else 
remains equal, but it did make validation against historical 
data challenging because other factors aﬀ ecting alcohol 
consumption, such as changed licensing hours, arose 
simultaneously with historical price changes.
In terms of generalisability, our model should prove an 
adaptable framework for other established market 
economies with similar epidemiological settings to 
England. A range of adaptations would be necessary, 
dependent both on data available and diﬀ erences in terms 
of drinking behaviour and health harms. Additional 
substitution eﬀ ects might need to be accounted for in 
countries with extensive cross-border trade. To understand 
the eﬀ ect of pricing policies in countries with high levels of 
unrecorded (home-produced, illicit, or smuggled) alcohol 
consumption, such as some regions of Africa and Asia, an 
alternative modelling approach might be needed. However, 
pricing policies might not be the most suitable interventions 
in these circumstances.30 For countries with similar 
beverage preferences to England, the estimated changes to 
consumption and harm might be a suitable approximation 
Figure 3: Estimated cumulative price distribution for the oﬀ -trade 
Estimates based on the Expenditure and Food Survey13 and Nielsen13 data.
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for the eﬀ ect of general price increases. The order-of-
magnitude validity of speciﬁ c minimum price policies and 
discount restrictions will depend on the similarity of the 
price and price-based promotion distributions. The model 
is capable of adaptation to international contexts and will 
be available for continued use in assessment of alcohol 
policies in the long term.
Our study is the ﬁ rst to appraise a range of speciﬁ c and 
relatively complex alcohol pricing policy options that are 
under consideration by policy makers in diﬀ erent parts of 
the UK and international government agencies. We hope 
that the estimated eﬀ ects in reduction of alcohol-related 
health harm, taking into account the eﬀ ects on diﬀ erent 
population subgroups of drinkers, will be considered by 
policy makers in the UK and internationally.
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